SYRIA: MIDDLE EAST OPPORTUNITY OR MISSED CHANCE?

9 December 2024

After more than 50 years of repressive autocratic rule, over 13 years of bloody civil war that displaced over 12 million people and a 12-day lighting offensive by opposition forces, the Assad family’s dominance of Syria has ended.  Initial elation is accompanied by deep uncertainty as to what comes next in Syria and its implications for the region and beyond.

A fundamental question prevails: will Syria transition from secular dictatorship to stable representative government or hardline Islamist authoritarianism, or some hybrid in between?

The politically and diplomatically correct reply is to express “cautious optimism” that Syria will pursue the path of a brighter future for its people.  However, most indications point to greater cause for caution than optimism.

HTS (Hayat Tharir Al-Sham), which spearheaded Assad’s downfall, arguably remains the strongest opposition force in Syria yet is listed as a terrorist group by the U.S., European Union, Turkey and others. The U.S. still has a $10 million bounty on HTS leader Mohammed Al Jolani, a former ISIS fighter, despite attempts to rebrand himself and his group as mainstream  Islamists.

Thus far, HTS has been preaching what  most, at home and abroad, want to hear: political moderation and inclusion of minorities.

However, HTS’s iron-fisted governance of Syria’s northwestern Idlib province in recent years points to the need for extreme vigilance of their intentions and long-term agenda.

In order to provide assurances, HTS must pursue genuine outreach to a wide range of opposition parties within an all-embracing political framework. This is key to an orderly transition that guarantees security and stability at home and the broader region. In the longer term, a new national compact will be needed.  A zero-sum approach by HTS, or any other opposition group, will simply backfire.

HTS has the advantage of controlling the key urban power centers including Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and Homs with an estimated fighting force of 30,000.  However, HTS simply cannot cover all of Syria at present. In order to ensure a basic degree of order and security, it must inevitably collaborate with local forces scattered throughout the country.

The alternative to an orderly political transition is internal fragmentation, sectarian warfare and spillover into the region and beyond.  Lessons from the recent past include Libya’s ongoing divisions since Qaddafi’s ouster in 2011 and years of sectarian bloodshed in Iraq.

Assad’s downfall clearly signifies the end of a political era and the start of a new one. However, for skeptics, the dictator’s demise also marks the start of a new and more complex phase in Syria’s civil war.

EXTERNAL ACTORS
Although outside powers will seek to influence Syria’s transition, they will be initially reduced to a wait-and-see role as the political process unfolds. For now, it will be primarily driven by Syrians with HTS in the lead.  Other factions will aggressively jockey for their share of power hoping that HTS, and like-minded groups, will curb their Islamist tendencies for the sake of the greater collective good.  While such groups will proceed with utmost caution in their dealings with HTS, skeptics will dismiss their attempts as wishful thinking.

Assad’s downfall marks a clear humiliation and devastating strategic blow for both Russia and Iran in the Middle East and beyond.  Iran loses its land bridge extending from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, often referred to as the Shiite crescent.  However, Iran still retains formidable loyal proxies in Iraq and Yemen’s Houthis that continue to destabilize the region and disrupt global trade and shipping in the Red Sea and Horn of Africa.

Russia faces a major strategic reversal with  the likely loss of key overseas naval and air bases in Syria that project its influence in the Middle East and Mediterranean and serve as a conduit to growing operations in Africa. Russian vessels and warplanes have already departed Syria. Any plans for either Libya or Sudan as substitute bases is not presently feasible due to lack of sufficient infrastructure.

Overall, Turkey has the most to lose from an unstable Syria. For over 13 years, it invested heavily in what is now the winning side in Syria’s civil war.  However, it still remains unclear whether Turkey’s investment will pay off.

Its primary strategic objectives remain securing its border with Syria and ensuring the return of over three million Syrian refugees, which became a political liability for Turkey’s ruling AK Party.

If Syria’s opposition forces turn on each other, Turkey remains vulnerable to a new wave of Syrian refugees and increasing challenges from Kurdish militants on both sides of the border.

European capitals are currently struggling with the continuing fallout of the Ukraine war, mass migration, internal political polarization, lackluster leadership, and the return of a determined Donald Trump as U.S. president.

Fears of spillover into Europe from Assad’s downfall  further complicates an already brewing powder keg. Memories of Middle East refugees flooding Europe, and its political fallout, just a decade ago still torments European capitals.

For Lebanon, Assad’s ouster presents an opportunity to create a more functional state with diminished outside interference, revive its stagnant economy and start returning Syrian refugees. Although Assad-allied Hizbullah may be down regionally, it’s not out domestically. It retains arms and remains a force to be reckoned with.  Geography ensures that events in Syria will continue to shape Lebanon’s future.

In recent times, Gulf States embarked on a rapprochement with Assad. His downfall triggers mixed reactions. The rise of Islamists is traditionally seen as a perennial existential threat by the monarchies of Saudi Arabia and UAE.  However, geopolitical necessity and new regional realities will force them to directly engage any new government in Syria much sooner than later.

With its traditional pro-Islamist sympathies, Qatar has previously supplied Syrian opposition factions. It will continue and expand upon its regular policy of outreach playing all sides to its strategic advantage as critical interlocutors.

Although the seeds for Assad’s downfall were planted years ago, Israeli attacks in both Lebanon and Syria in recent months against Hizbullah and pro-Iranian targets  served as a critical catalyst in accelerating the regime’s demise. As Damascus was falling to the opposition, Israeli forces were already occupying the buffer zone separating Israel and Syria and bombing suspected chemical stockpiles in Syria.  For Israel, Assad was a fairly convenient and predictable opponent. However, in a rapidly changing Middle East, Israel cannot afford any form of complacency. The fresh memories of October 7th, 2023, serve as a constant reminder.

With 900 troops in enclaves in eastern Syria, the U.S. has been primarily focused on containing the spread of post-ISIS, jihadist activities in recent years. However, in a post-Assad Syria, the U.S. will have to skillfully navigate a more complex regional landscape beyond simple kinetic military action. The new incoming Trump administration must embark on a strategic rethink of U.S. Middle East policy to adapt to new regional realities.

While Jordan remains directly exposed to events in Syria, it remains a close U.S. ally and plays a critical role in supporting U.S. operations in eastern Syria.

Throughout Syria’s civil war Iran-backed Iraqi militias played a key role in propping up the Assad regime. Now with its downfall, they risk losing the arms trade that extended from Iran into Syria and Lebanon, and often beyond, and potential instability in Sunni-majority areas like Iraq’s Anbar province and Kirkuk, an oil-rich Kurdish majority city.

Iranian influence practically permeates every sector of Iraqi society. Its loss of credibility and prestige in the region risks adversely impacting its longer term influence in Iraq, and potentially other quarters throughout the Middle East and beyond.

CONCLUSION
In recent decades, the Middle East has experienced several new dawns that have degenerated into long dusks.

With the fall of the Assad regime, Syria and the broader region have a rare historic opportunity to alter course.  However, it will take an exceptional, but not impossible, act of Syrian and regional collective will, enlightened leadership and public support to defy historic precedent, which currently favors the skeptics.

*Portions of this article were published in the South China Morning Post, Latin America’s El Nacional and Italy’s Formiche.